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INTRODUCTION
The citizens of a small town in the path of a fast-growing industry,
residents of St. James, Louisiana,1 face concerns about their health and the
health of their families due to pollution arising from the industrialization
Copyright 2021, by SEBASTIEN JONGBLOETS.
1. St. James is a census-designated place within St. James Parish; this
Comment will include “Parish” when referring to St. James Parish. St. James
Parish, Louisiana, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._James_Parish,_
Louisiana [https://perma.cc/XC87-WLSJ] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020).
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of former farmlands bordering their community.2 Known to the locals as
“Cancer Alley,” Louisiana’s petrochemical3 corridor is an 85-mile stretch
along the Mississippi River housing over 100 petrochemical plants.4 In
spite of their concerns about their health, the low-income citizens of St.
James cannot afford to escape Cancer Alley as a result of the devaluation
of their homes caused by the increasing amount of industrial infrastructure
near their community.5
Despite pushback from the residents of St. James, the growth of
infrastructure within the area has not slowed: in 2018, controversy arose
regarding the construction of the Bayou Bridge Pipeline, a 163-mile crude
oil pipeline running from Lake Charles to St. James Parish in Louisiana.6
Bayou Bridge’s parent company, Energy Transfer Partners, is responsible
for 527 hazardous incidents between the years 2002 and 2017.7 After
protests in opposition of the pipeline, the Louisiana Legislature amended
Louisiana’s “critical infrastructure” statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 14:61, to protect pipelines from criminal trespass, leading to the
arrests of protestors.8
2. Lauren Zanolli, ‘Cancer Alley’ residents say industry is hurting town,
THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 6, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jun/06/louisiana-cancer-alley-st-james-industry-environment [https://
perma.cc/DAU6-4ZYZ].
3. “Petrochemical” is defined as “a chemical isolated or derived from
petroleum or natural gas.” Petrochemical, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/petrochemical [https://perma.cc/89MW-QL69]
(last visited Aug. 3, 2020).
4. Julie Dermansky, Breaking: Environmental Justice March Hits Road Block
in Louisiana’s Cancer Alley, DESMOG (May 31, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www
.desmogblog.com/2019/05/31/environmental-justice-march-louisiana-cancer-alley
[https://perma.cc/C8UX-DYH4].
5. Zanolli, supra note 2.
6. Erin Mundahl, Protestors in Louisiana Take to Treesitting, Kayaks to
Stop Bayou Bridge Pipeline, INSIDESOURCES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.in
sidesources.com/protesters-in-louisiana-take-to-treesitting-kayaks-to-stop-bayou
-bridge-pipeline [https://perma.cc/9DA7-SZMT].
7. Mark Schleifstein, Bayou Bridge Pipeline Owners Had 527 Hazardous
Incidents Over 16 Years, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 17, 2018, 7:55 PM),
https://www.nola.com/news/environment/article_e6b40553-c4af-5792-98da-a32
8bc68dd4e.html [https://perma.cc/DJA9-GHUG].
8. Act No. 692, 2018 La. Acts 2114 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61
(2018)); Steve Hardy, Protest a Pipeline, Become a Felon?, THE ADVOCATE (May
22, 2019, 4:30 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/environ
ment/article_47bf22f6-7bf6-11e9-9e4b-bbd2c9dfcd97.html [https://perma.cc/VJ
R7-6ZRN].
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As of 2019, protestors arrested under section 14:61 have filed two
complaints in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.9
These complaints challenge both the constitutionality of Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 14:61 and the arrests made under the statute,
alleging in part that the legislative action is impermissible viewpoint
discrimination10 in violation of the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.11
This Comment argues that the changes to Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 14:61 should be revoked because the statute is impermissibly
vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution,12 and the
statute infringes on the values underlying the First Amendment:13 selfrealization, preserving the “marketplace of ideas,” and upholding
democracy. Part I will provide a background of the conflict arising from
the construction of the Bayou Bridge Pipeline and will highlight the
changes made to Louisiana’s critical infrastructure statute. Part II will
provide the standard for determining unconstitutional vagueness. This Part
will also underscore policy concerns, including the difficulties in
complying with and enforcing a vague statute, in order to determine
whether Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61 is impermissibly vague
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.14 Part III
will then provide an overview of modern First Amendment doctrine,
focusing on the United States Supreme Court’s tiered scrutiny approach
and the tests to be applied to the expressive conduct taken by protestors of
the pipeline. This Part will also analyze Louisiana Revised Statutes section
14:61 under the legal framework provided. Part IV will present the
problem of synthesizing a collective legislative intent from the statements
of individual legislators and determining the true intent of officials despite
their ability to conceal impermissible motives. Part V will suggest moving
toward an approach that discerns legislative intent based upon the effects
of a regulation in order to bypass the problems with determining an
improper governmental motive within current First Amendment doctrine.
9. Complaint, Hat v. Landry, No. 3:19-cv-00322 (M.D. La. May 22, 2019),
2019 WL 2209382 [hereinafter Hat Complaint]; Complaint, Spoon v. Bayou
Bridge Pipeline LLC, No. 3:19-cv-00516 (M.D. La. Aug. 9, 2019), 2019 WL
3781092 [hereinafter Spoon Complaint].
10. Viewpoint discrimination occurs when “[t]he law . . . reflects the
Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive.” Iancu v.
Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019).
11. Hat Complaint supra note 9; Spoon Complaint supra note 9.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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I. LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES SECTION 14:61 AND THE PIPELINE
PROTESTS
On May 5, 2018, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act No. 692 in
order to change definitions found within Louisiana’s “critical
infrastructure” statute.15 Most notably, the statute was amended to include
“pipelines” among the transportation facilities falling within the definition
of “critical infrastructure.”16 Act No. 692 also created the crime of
“criminal damage to a critical infrastructure,”17 establishing a penalty of
imprisonment of no more than 20 years or a fine of not more than $25,000
if “human life will be threatened or [if] operations of a critical
infrastructure will be disrupted as a result of the conduct.”18 The Louisiana
Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association (“LMOGA”)—the trade
association responsible for proposing the amendment to Louisiana’s
critical infrastructure statute—stated that the regulation “protects
Louisiana and its citizens from individuals who attempt to unlawfully
interrupt construction of pipeline projects or damage existing
facilities[.]”19 LMOGA also stated that damage to infrastructure in
Louisiana “risks interrupting critical services across the United States.”20
Though the changes to Louisiana’s critical infrastructure statute may
seem benign, an individual may struggle with interpreting the statute
because of the sheer number of pipelines within the state. LMOGA
estimates that there are approximately 87,764 miles of pipeline onshore in
Louisiana, and approximately 125,000 total miles of pipeline in the state.21
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61, an individual’s
15. Act No. 692, 2018 La. Acts 2114 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61
(2018)). As of 2020, a new bill had been proposed to further add “water control
structures, floodgates, and pump stations” to the definition of critical
infrastructure, but after passage was vetoed by the Governor. H.B. 197, 2020 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (La. 2020).
16. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61 (2018).
17. Act No. 692, 2018 La. Acts 2114 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61
(2018)).
18. Id.
19. Sabrina Canfield, Louisiana Trespass Law Targeting Pipeline Protestors
Spurs Lawsuit, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (May 22, 2019), https://www.court
housenews.com/louisiana-trespass-law-targeting-pipeline-protests-spurs-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/GB3Z-EAAZ].
20. Id.
21. Pipeline Infrastructure Huge Asset for Southwest Louisiana, LA. MIDCONTINENT OIL & GAS ASS’N (May 14, 2013), https://www.lmoga.com/news
/pipeline-infrastructure-huge-asset-for-southwest-louisiana [https://perma.cc/WE
Z4-FXSH].

350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd 262

2/25/21 8:41 AM

2021]

COMMENT

259

unauthorized entry onto areas where these pipelines run may result in
imprisonment, a fine, or both, despite the fact that these pipelines cross
through major highways and navigable waterways throughout the state.22
Thus, the statute’s vagueness may result in the arrest of individuals who
believe they are in a place where they are permitted to be.23
In addition to the vagueness issue described above, the circumstances
surrounding the modifications to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61
suggest that the Louisiana Legislature may have intended for the change
to silence protestors in violation of the First Amendment.24 This legislation
arose during the construction of the Bayou Bridge Pipeline, a 163-mile
crude oil pipeline running from Lake Charles, Louisiana to St. James,
Louisiana, for the purpose of “provid[ing] Gulf Coast refineries more
efficient and sustainable access to North American crude oil.”25 L’eau Est
La Vie Camp, a floating pipeline resistance organization, and residents of
St. James opposed the construction of the pipeline due to several public
interest and safety concerns, including: (1) threats to the ecosystem of the
Atchafalaya Basin, the largest river swamp in North America;26 (2) threats
to drinking water in Terrebonne and Lafourche Parish because of the risk
of contamination of Bayou Lafourche; and (3) an increased risk of harm
to the residents of St. James.27 As a result of these concerns, protestors
turned to expressive conduct,28 such as kayaking on public waterways near
where the pipeline was under construction and building aerial pods within

22. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61 (2018); Office of Conservation – Pipeline Division
– Pipeline Operations Program, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., http://www.dnr
.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/page/150 [https://perma.cc/7QNN-SFUU] (last visited
Aug. 3, 2020); see also Louisiana Pipelines & Platforms, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RES.,
http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/images/oilgas/refineries/LA_pipelines_2008.j
pg [https://perma.cc/MPZ2-CQRW] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020).
23. See Hat Complaint, supra note 9.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. BAYOU BRIDGE, https://bayoubridge.com/ [https://perma.cc/QZB3-NX
DS] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020).
26. Atchafalaya Basin, ATCHAFALAYA.ORG, https://www.atchafalaya.org/
atchafalaya-basin# [https://perma.cc/48YG-LFTQ] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020).
27. L'eau Est La Vie: The Fight at Standing Rock Continues in the Bayous of
Louisiana, VOID NETWORK (Dec. 18, 2018), https://voidnetwork.gr/2018/12/18/
leau-est-la-vie-fight-standing-rock-continues-bayous-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc
/FXL4-YJ6K].
28. “Expressive conduct is behavior designed to convey a message.” Katrina
Hoch, Expressive Conduct, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://
www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/952/expressive-conduct [https://perma.cc/
7LJR-QJUE] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020).
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trees set to be cut down, to bring attention to the potential environmental
harm caused by pipeline construction.29
L’eau Est La Vie set up its resistance camp in June of 2017 and began
its demonstrations against pipeline construction.30 On August 1, 2018, the
amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61 took effect.31 On
August 9, 2018, several protestors of the Bayou Bridge Pipeline were
arrested and charged under the statute for trespassing near “critical
infrastructure,” in this case, the pipeline under construction.32 As a result
of these arrests, the aggrieved protestors filed two complaints in the
Middle District of Louisiana challenging the constitutionality of section
14:61.
Stemming from the arrests of protestors on August 9, 2018, the
complaint in Hat v. Landry (“the Hat complaint”) alleges that Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 14:61 is unconstitutional on its face and as
applied.33 Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the statute: (1) is
unconstitutional on its face because it is overly vague in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) is overbroad and
chills constitutionally protected speech; and (3) targets expressive conduct
with a specific viewpoint for harsher punishment in violation of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.34
The complaint in Spoon v. Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC (“the Spoon
complaint”) arises from additional arrests of protestors on September 3,
2018.35 The Spoon plaintiffs alleged that Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC, and
HUB Enterprises, Inc.,36 contracted with officials to arrest pipeline
protestors boating in the public waterways of the state in retaliation for the
exercise of protected speech that expressed opposition toward the
construction of the pipeline.37
29. Mundahl, supra note 6.
30. Yessenia Funes, Prayer and Construction Camp Launches in Louisiana to
Challenge Pipeline Connected to DAPL, COLORLINES (Jun 26, 2017, 12:39PM),
https://www.colorlines.com/articles/icymi-prayer-and-resistance-camp-launcheslouisiana-challenge-pipeline-connected-dapl [https://perma.cc/K329-MD76].
31. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61 (2018).
32. Mike Ludwig, Water Protectors Charged with Felonies Under
Louisiana’s Anti-Protest Law, TRUTHOUT.ORG (Aug. 17, 2018), https://truthout
.org/articles/water-protectors-charged-with-felonies-under-louisianas-anti-protestlaw/ [https://perma.cc/6SYC-VQWX].
33. Hat Complaint, supra note 9.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Spoon Complaint, supra note 9, at 1.
36. HUB Enterprises is a company which was responsible for providing
security services during the construction of the Bayou Bridge Pipeline. See id. at 8.
37. Id. at 21; id. at 65–78.
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II. UNCONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61 is overly vague because it is
unclear for those attempting to abide by the law, and because it provides
authorities standardless discretion in its enforcement, resulting in an
unconstitutional chilling of expressive conduct.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution requires clarity in regulation and “the invalidation of
laws that are impermissibly vague.”38 A violation of due process occurs
when a statute “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages
seriously discriminatory enforcement.”39 In effect, this doctrine should aid
in eliminating confusion relating to both compliance with and enforcement
of the law.40 In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., the Court
articulated two policy concerns regarding ordinances conferring
standardless administrative discretion to public officials: (1) selfcensorship by individuals to avoid punishment under the law resulting in
an unconstitutional chilling of free speech, and (2) difficulty preventing
content-based censorship on a case-by-case basis.41
Louisiana’s critical infrastructure statute is overly vague because it
does not sufficiently clarify where within the state’s 125,000 miles of
pipeline individuals are allowed to express their views against the
construction of a pipeline.42 First, although Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 14:61 maintains that the critical infrastructure must be “enclosed
by any type of physical barrier,”43 it does not clarify what this physical
barrier requirement means. Because the public waterways of the state are
not enclosed by any physical barriers, this is especially confusing to
protestors who are arrested near waterways.44 This ambiguity is likely to
38. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Fox Television, 567 U.S. at 253.
40. Fox Television, 567 U.S. at 253.
41. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988)
(holding that a statute giving a mayor unbridled discretion over whether to permit
news racks is unconstitutional).
42. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61 (2018); see also LMOGA Statement on
Critical Infrastructure Protection, LA. MID CONTINENT OIL AND GAS ASS’N,
https://www.lmoga.com/news/lmoga-statement-on-critical-infrastructure-protect
ion [https://perma.cc/95JT-AVDB] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
43. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61(A)(1) (2018).
44. Jessica Corbett, Anti-Pipeline Kayaktivists Hit With Felony Charges
Under Louisiana’s New ALEC-Inspired Law That Criminalizes Protest, COMMON
DREAMS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.commondreams.org/news/2018/08/10/
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have the effect of self-censorship because if individuals cannot discern
where they can express their beliefs without being arrested and charged
with a felony, they may find self-censorship to be a safer alternative. An
individual may be especially confused when officers arrest protestors in
waterways around the pipeline, despite statutory language stating that
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61 shall not be construed to apply
to “[l]awful assembly and peaceful and orderly . . . demonstration” or
“boating in the open or unconfined areas around a pipeline.”45
A law is also impermissibly vague when it is “so standardless that it
authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”46 Under
section 14:61, police officers, prosecutors, and juries are responsible for
deciding who should be punished under the critical infrastructure statute.47
Though the statute purports to allow peaceful protest,48 officers have used
their discretion to arrest protestors canoeing and kayaking in navigable
waters.49 It is unlikely that these arrests are unrelated to the views
expressed, especially since the Spoon petition alleged that the officers
were instructed to conduct the arrests by agents or employees of a private
security company providing services to Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC.50
III. FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
In order to analyze a protestor’s First Amendment claims—that
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61 is overly vague and suppresses
speech—it is necessary to establish how the United States Supreme Court
analyzes regulations contested under the First Amendment.51 This Part
will first explain the importance of protecting free speech and expression
by highlighting the values underlying the First Amendment: individual
self-fulfillment, the societal search for truth, and the preservation of
democracy. This Part will then provide three approaches used to determine
whether a regulation serves these values.

anti-pipeline-kayaktivists-hit-felony-charges-under-louisianas-new-alec-inspired
-law [https://perma.cc/Z656-HZ7Y].
45. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61(D)(1); LA. REV .STAT. § 14:61(D)(2); Spoon
Complaint, supra note 9 (challenging the constitutionality of the arrest of
plaintiffs therein who were protesting in a kayak in a public waterway).
46. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).
47. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61.
48. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61(D).
49. Spoon Complaint, supra note 9.
50. Id.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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A. The Value of Protecting Free Expression
Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”52
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he freedom of
speech . . . which [is] secured by the First Amendment against abridgment
by the United States [is] among the fundamental personal rights and
liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment
against abridgment by a state.”53 In order to protect these rights, it is
important to identify the values underlying them.
The first theory supporting the First Amendment—the “selfrealization” theory—focuses on the “privilege to speak one’s mind[.]”54
Under the self-realization theory, free speech serves the value of individual
self-fulfillment.55 Individuals are entitled to form their own beliefs and
opinions, and the individual should be able to express these beliefs in order
to realize their potential as a human being.56 Repressive societies—those
that ban free speech or heavily control the speech of their constituents—
reduce individuals’ ownership of their lives by interfering with this basic
principle.57 Repressing speech reduces the ability of individuals to make
personal choices as to their way of life because they are barred from
communicating knowledge and shaping their own views.58
A second theory explaining the importance of free speech focuses on
the societal attainment of truth by preserving the “marketplace of ideas.”59
Under this theory, open debate is more likely to lead to a greater
availability of ideas, which allows individuals to make more rational
judgments because they can consider facts and arguments on either side of
a proposition.60 For example, if the government bans educational
institutions from teaching evolution, and individuals are only able to hear
arguments in favor of creationism, judgments that creationism must be the
truth will be less sound, as the individuals would not consider the possible
52. Id.
53. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
54. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
55. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6–7 (4th ed. 2014); Thomas
I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877,
879 (1963).
56. Emerson, supra note 55, at 879.
57. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 6; see also Emerson, supra note 55, at 879.
58. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 6; see also Emerson, supra note 55, at 879.
59. FARBER, supra note 55, at 6–7; Emerson, supra note 55, at 881.
60. FARBER, supra note 55, at 6; Emerson, supra note 55, at 881–82.
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alternatives. Alternatively, if each individual is able to make their
decisions by considering opposing viewpoints, society, by the collective
judgment of its members, is thereby pushed forward in its quest for truth.61
A third theory focuses on the democratic value of free speech.62 If the
government derives its powers from the consent of the community, it is
necessary that citizens are able to express their beliefs in order to exercise
this consent.63 For example, if the government restricts the speech of a
specific political party during a presidential election, democracy is
offended, as voters are no longer free to consider the views of that party.64
Though it may be argued that this theory operates to protect only political
speech, self-realization theorists argue that maintaining a democratic
government fosters self-realization among its citizens by allowing them
the freedom to shape their own way of life.65
B. How Does the First Amendment Protect Speech?
Two effects-based models are used to determine whether a contested
regulation infringes upon an individual’s self-fulfillment or the
marketplace of ideas: the “speaker-based” model, and the “audiencebased” model.66 The speaker-based model values self-realization, thus any
limitation on speech or expressive conduct necessarily harms individuals
because the limitation reduces the benefit they derive from being able to
communicate.67 Using the speaker-based model, laws that suppress more
speech will cause greater harm.68 Alternatively, the audience-based model
values the societal search for truth by preserving the marketplace of
ideas.69 Under the audience-based model, importance is placed on the
extent to which legislation distorts or impoverishes public discourse,
rather than the amount of speech restricted.70
61. Emerson, supra note 55, at 881–82.
62. Id. at 882–84.
63. Id. at 883.
64. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 7 (“[I]f democracy is to function effectively,
there must be a good deal of latitude for criticizing the government . . . [i]t doesn’t
make much sense to have a ‘free’ election if opponents of the government have been
gagged.”).
65. Id. at 8.
66. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 424 (1996).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 424–25.
70. Id.
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For example, suppose a group of ten people are discussing whether to
vaccinate their children. If nine people within the group believe that
children should be vaccinated and only one expresses a contrary
viewpoint, the authorities silencing five of the pro-vaccine individuals
would certainly restrict a larger amount of speech. It would not have a
distorting effect on the discourse, however, as their viewpoint is still
accessible through the remaining majority. Alternatively, if the antivaccine individual is silenced, substantially less speech is suppressed, but
there is a larger distortion of discourse, as that viewpoint is no longer
accessible to the rest of the group. Thus, a combination of the two effectsbased approaches should be used to preserve an individual’s ability to
achieve self-realization and to maintain a rich marketplace of ideas.
Finally, a third approach, the “government-based” model, focuses on
the motive behind a regulation rather than its effects.71 Some overlap exists
between this motive-based model and the effects-based models, though,
as the effects of a regulation often reflect the motives of the legislature.
For example, if a state government enacts a harsher penalty for speeding,
and that regulation has the effect of reducing the overall amount of car
accidents, one can reasonably assume that the legislative intent behind
heightening the penalty was to reduce the number of accidents. In addition,
the two values underlying the effects-based approaches—self-realization
and the search for truth—may both be considered when determining what
constitutes a permissible governmental motive.72 For example, a
governmental motive to silence a certain viewpoint may be deemed
impermissible specifically because it stifles an individual’s self-realization
or distorts the public discourse.
IV. MODERN FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
This Part will first show how the First Amendment protects expressive
conduct in order to establish a link between the values underlying the
protection of speech and the methods taken by pipeline protestors to
express their views (kayaking and tree-sitting). This Part will then explain
the United States Supreme Court’s tiered-scrutiny approach, in which the
Court applies a different level of scrutiny based upon whether a regulation
targets specific content or bans speech without respect to content.73
71. Id. at 425–26.
72. Id. at 427–28.
73. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); McCullen v. Coakley,
573 U.S. 464 (2014); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
289 (1984).
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A. Expressive Conduct
First Amendment protection is not exclusive to speech; rather, the
Supreme Court also affords protections to expressive conduct that
qualifies as symbolic speech.74 In determining whether specific conduct
warrants First Amendment protection, the Court considers whether the
conduct was intended to convey a particularized message and whether the
audience would understand that message.75 For example, in Spence v.
Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that the application of
a Washington statute prohibiting improper use of an American flag to the
expressive conduct of a college student was unconstitutional.76 The
appellant had used black tape to construct a peace sign on a United States
flag, which he then displayed from his apartment window in protest of the
United States’ invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State
University.77 In overturning the appellant’s conviction, the Court reasoned
that the appellant’s conduct was protected under the First Amendment
because his message was direct and likely to be understood as an antiviolence message.78
Not all conduct intended to express an idea is protected by the First
Amendment.79 For example, a criminal defendant who set their exspouse’s house on fire may have intended for their arson to communicate
a message to the victim, but the public would likely still wish for the
arsonist to be punished, regardless of how expressive the conduct was. The
United States Supreme Court has held that “when both ‘speech’ and
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important government interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms.”80 The government interest is sufficient to uphold a statute
when: (1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of the
government; (2) the regulation furthers a substantial interest; (3) the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and (4) the incidental restriction on the First Amendment is not more
74. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding
that students wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War constitutes
symbolic speech, affording them First Amendment protection).
75. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). See WASH REV.
CODE § 9.86.030 (Westlaw 2019) (prohibiting desecration of the American flag).
76. Id. at 405–08.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 414.
79. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
80. Id.
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restrictive than needed to further the governmental interest.81 In order to
apply this test it is necessary to understand how the United States Supreme
Court’s tiered-scrutiny approach operates to determine whether a
regulation violates the First Amendment.82
B. Tiered-Scrutiny Approach
In analyzing the constitutionality of statutes under the First
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court uses a “tiered-scrutiny”
approach.83 Under this approach, the Court applies a different standard
based upon whether a particular regulation is considered content-neutral
or content-based.84 Though First Amendment jurisprudence does not
establish a clear definition of this distinction,85 the United States Supreme
Court in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC provided that contentbased regulations are those which “distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed.”86
Alternatively, content-neutral regulations are those that burden speech
without reference to specific views or ideas expressed.87 For example, a
law prohibiting the display or distribution of campaign materials within a
set distance of a polling station is content-based because it favors nonpolitical speech while suppressing political speech.88 Alternatively, a
regulation prohibiting the posting of signs on public property is contentneutral, as it does not reference or favor any specific view or idea.89
If a regulation is found to be content-based, it is presumptively
unconstitutional.90 The regulation is subject to “strict scrutiny”—which

81. Id. at 377.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
83. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); McCullen v. Coakley,
573 U.S. 464 (2014); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
289 (1984).
84. FARBER, supra note 55, at 25–27.
85. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (stating that
the governmental purpose in enacting a regulation is the “controlling
consideration” in determining whether that regulation is content-neutral or
content-based). But see Reed, 576 U.S. at 165–66 (stating that a facial
determination must be made as to whether a regulation is content-neutral or
content-based before inquiring into legislative intent).
86. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).
87. Id.
88. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197–98 (1992).
89. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1988).
90. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.
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requires the contested regulation to have the least restrictive speechsuppressing effect.91
If a regulation is content-neutral, the government may enact time,
place, and manner restrictions on speech, which are subject to a lower level
of scrutiny.92 For example, a blanket prohibition on passing out leaflets
within a set distance from a polling station does not discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint, but it identifies a specific place where a certain manner
of speech (handing out leaflets) is prohibited. It is permissible for the
government to enact time, place, and manner restrictions on speech and
expressive conduct when the restriction: (1) is justified without reference
to the content of regulated speech (content-neutral); (2) is “narrowly
tailored” to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) leaves open
“ample alternative channels of communication.”93 The “narrowly tailored”
prong is fulfilled when the government interests at issue would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and the means chosen are
not substantially broader than necessary to achieve that interest.94 Thus, a
content-neutral statute does not unlawfully suppress free speech simply
because there is a less restrictive alternative available.95
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Court clarified that a facial
determination of content-neutrality must be made before contemplating
the legislative intent.96 The Court held that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred in determining that a regulation
exempting certain categories of signs from a permit requirement was
content-neutral simply because the regulation was not adopted based on a
disagreement with certain messages conveyed.97 Instead, the Court said
that a facial determination must first be made because “an innocuous
justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is
content neutral.”98 In Reed, the regulation was content-based, as it treated
different categories of signs disparately. Therefore, the regulation was
subject to strict scrutiny.99 Rather than eliminating the inquiry into
legislative purpose or justification, Reed established that a two-step
analysis is necessary.100 The first step of this analysis is to determine
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 787 (1989).
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
Ward, 491 U.S. at 783.
Id. at 798.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 166 (2015).
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 166.
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whether the regulation on its face is content-neutral or content-based.101 If
the regulation is facially content-based, the inquiry ends and strict scrutiny
is applied; however, when the regulation is facially content-neutral, it is
then proper to determine whether the government had a content-based
purpose in enacting the legislation.102 If it is determined that the legislative
motive was content-based, strict scrutiny will be applied to the facially
content-neutral regulation.103
Though Reed provides guidance in determining which classification a
regulation falls into, some scholars argue that this approach results in the
under-protection of speech.104 This is because making the determination
that a regulation is facially content-neutral implies that the government is
not attempting to sway the public discourse in any particular direction.105
The next step in the Reed analysis is to look at governmental motive; an
“asserted [governmental] interest . . . may be only a façade for contentbased suppression.”106 An asserted content-neutral interest, then, may
result in a lower standard of scrutiny being applied to a facially contentneutral regulation, which ultimately has the effect of suppressing speech
based on content.
Another problem that arises is the “intermediate scrutiny” standard
being applied by lower courts to any governmental regulation of speech
that does not trigger strict scrutiny.107 Scholars argue that this standard
disproportionality favors the government by upholding regulations, in turn
suppressing speech and thus veering away from the policies articulated by
the Supreme Court.108

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L.
REV. 65, 92 (2017).
105. Id.
106. Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
821 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 830 (2007).
108. See id. at 830–31; see also Armijo, supra note 104, at 96 n.138; Leslie
Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 237 (2012)
(“Content-based laws receive strict scrutiny, which nearly always proves fatal.
Meanwhile, content-neutral laws receive what the Court calls ‘intermediate
scrutiny,’ in practice a highly deferential form of review which virtually all laws
pass.”).
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C. Application of the Tiered Scrutiny Approach to Louisiana Revised
Statutes Section 14:61
On its face, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61 is contentneutral.109 First, the statute does not single out a specific viewpoint to be
suppressed. Rather, the statute simply prohibits the unauthorized entry
onto critical infrastructure.110 Second, the statute states that it shall not be
construed to prevent “[l]awful assembly . . . to express ideas or views
regarding legitimate matters of public interest.”111 This is likely fatal to the
claims currently challenging the constitutionality of the regulation under
the First Amendment, as lower courts generally uphold facially contentneutral regulations when applying time, place, and manner regulations, as
well as “intermediate scrutiny.”112 However, despite being content-neutral,
section 14:61 may be subject to strict scrutiny if it is found that the
legislature had an improper motive.113
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the United States Supreme Court clarified
its view that while it is irrelevant to consider the governmental purpose
behind a content-based statute, for a facially content-neutral statute,
governmental motive determines the standard of review.114 The Court
stated that when a statute is found to be facially content-neutral, it is
appropriate to then conduct an analysis of the legislative intent.115 Thus, a
deciding court must look to legislative purpose to determine whether the
regulation is “justified without reference to the content of speech.”116 If
the governmental purpose is then found to be content-based
(discriminatory of a certain viewpoint), the court must apply strict
scrutiny.117
The government cannot restrict speech or expressive conduct on the
basis that: (1) the government disagrees with the ideas of the speaker; 118
(2) the ideas threaten a government official’s own self-interest;119 or (3)
privileging certain ideas advances the government’s own interest.120 The
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
Id. at 166.
Id. at 167.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
Reed, 576 U.S. at 166.
Kagan, supra note 66, at 428.
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applicable standard regarding section 14:61 should be strict scrutiny, due
to an impermissible legislative motive underlying the regulation.
The modifications to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61 seem
to be a direct response to the Bayou Bridge Pipeline protests for four
reasons. First, this is evidenced by the addition of pipelines to the
definition of “critical infrastructure” protected by the statute, as well as the
creation of heightened penalties aimed at deterring those speaking out
against the further construction of pipelines within the state.121 Second, the
arrests of protestors were made within weeks of the modification of the
statute, supporting the contention that the legislature made these changes
to silence protestors.122 Third, a sponsor of Louisiana House Bill 727,
which gave rise to the changes in section 14:61, could potentially have a
personal motive for silencing protestors of pipeline construction in
Louisiana, as energy and natural resources companies are his or her
leading campaign donor by sector.123 Finally, the national trend of statutes
protecting critical infrastructure which arose after the Dakota Access
Pipeline protests seems to suggest that the fear of opposition toward
pipeline construction is what led the Louisiana Legislature to amend
section 14:61.124

121. Act No. 692, 2018 La. Acts 2114 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61
(2018)).
122. Alleen Brown, Pipeline Opponents Strike Back Against Anti Protest
Laws, THE INTERCEPT (May 23, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/05/23/
pipeline-protest-laws-louisiana-south-dakota/ [https://perma.cc/PHY4-7NE6];
Hat Complaint, supra note 9, at 2; Spoon Complaint, supra note 9.
123. Alleen Brown & Will Parrish, Louisiana and Minnesota Introduce AntiProtest Bills Amid Fights Over Bayou Bridge and Enbridge Pipelines, THE
INTERCEPT (Mar 31, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/03/31/
louisiana-minnesota-anti-protest-bills-bayou-bridge-enbridge-pipelines/ [https://
perma.cc/JR72-F78U].
124. See H.B. 3557, 86th Leg. (Tex. 2019) (creating a criminal penalty for
“impairing or interrupting operation of a critical infrastructure facility” and
adding “any pipeline transporting oil or gas” to the definition of “critical
infrastructure”); S.B. 471, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019)
(heightened the criminal penalties for knowingly entering a critical infrastructure
facility without permission, allowing a sentencing of up to 30 months in prison);
H.B. 355, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019) (includes a punishment
of up to one year in jail and a $2,000 fine for trespassing with the intent to “impede
or inhibit the operations” of a facility, including any oil or gas pipeline). See also
Dakota Rural Action v. Noem, 416 F. Supp. 3d 874, 880 (D.S.D. 2019) (providing
a background of the constitutional claim against South Dakota’s riot boosting
statute).
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V. THE UNDERLYING ISSUE
A. Distortion of Public Discourse
If left unchanged, the amendments to Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 14:61 will distort the public discourse, impeding the societal search
for truth. Though content-neutral on its face, section 14:61 has the effect
of suppressing speech made in opposition of pipeline construction125 as
protestors who wish to speak out against the pipeline are being arrested.126
As a result, others who oppose the pipeline construction may begin to
engage in self-censorship to avoid punishment. Without access to the
protestors’ viewpoint, members of the public are less equipped to make a
rational judgment regarding whether pipeline construction should
continue in the state.127 This is not to say that the modifications will simply
prevent the public from understanding the plight of protestors, but rather
that the statute prevents the public from encountering competing ideas
which would enable them to make the best judgment on the issue of
whether the infrastructure should be constructed.
One may argue that a content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction is still appropriate in regards to section 14:61, since preventing
protestors from expressing their viewpoints near a critical infrastructure
does not stop them from communicating their viewpoints through other
means; however, the protestors’ expressive conduct–such as tree-sitting
and kayaking–contains an intent to convey a particularized message.128
Specifically, tree-sitting expresses the concern of the protestors regarding
environmental harm to the Atchafalaya basin because the trees must be cut
down in order to construct the pipeline.129
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, the U.S. Supreme
Court evaluated the constitutionality of a “camping” regulation that
prevented the demonstrators from sleeping in tents in Lafayette Park
overnight to protest the plight of the homeless in the nation’s capital.130
After assuming that the sleep-in was constitutionally protected behavior,
the Court held that this was a permissible time, place, and manner

125. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:61 (2018).
126. Corbett, supra note 44.
127. See Emerson, supra note 55, at 881 (“suppression of information,
discussion, or the clash of opinion prevents one from reaching the most rational
judgement, blocks the generation of new ideas, and tends to perpetuate error”).
128. Mundahl, supra note 6.
129. Id.
130. 468 U.S. 288, 289–91 (1984).
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restriction.131 Highlighting the importance of the place and manner chosen
by demonstrators therein, Justice Marshall criticized the majority for
assuming, without discussing, that the behavior was constitutionally
protected.132 Justice Marshall, dissenting in Clark, discussed the
importance of the specific conduct chosen by protestors.133 He emphasized
that camping in the tents overnight was a powerful manner of bringing
awareness to the fact that homeless individuals must sleep outside in these
conditions throughout the winter.134 Additionally, the location chosen,
Lafayette Park,135 highlighted the political character of the conduct.136
Because the majority failed to consider this, Justice Marshall argued that
the Court made it too easy to provide an interest that justified abridgement
of the protected conduct.137 Justice Marshall’s dissent illustrates why the
place and manner chosen by the pipeline protestors is significant; an
argument that protestors can communicate in alternative channels of
communication would, as the majority did in Clark, ignore the
significance of the manner and location chosen by protestors.138 This
oversight eases the government’s burden of providing an interest sufficient
to outweigh the protected conduct by reducing the importance of that
conduct.139 Thus, it is important to consider the increased value to public
discourse by the method of expression chosen by protestors of the Bayou
Bridge Pipeline.
Regardless of whether “ample alternative” avenues exist for a
protestor’s message, the vagueness of section 14:61 and fear of criminal
penalties will have the effect of chilling constitutional speech that
complies with these time, place, and manner regulations due to
individuals’ self-censorship because of fear of punishment.140 Thus, even
if the statute is upheld as a permissible content-neutral time, place, and
131. Id. at 288–89.
132. Id. at 301–02 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Lafayette Park, located in Washington, D.C., has been “a racetrack, a
graveyard, a zoo, a slave market, an encampment for soldiers during the War of
1812, and the site of many political protests and celebrations.” Lafayette Square,
Washington, DC, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/real-estate/
historic-preservation/explore-historic-buildings/heritage-tourism/our-capital/lafa
yette-square-washington-dc [https://perma.cc/66YQ-YQ8M] (last visited Oct. 14,
2020).
136. Clark, 468 U.S. at 302 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. See Clark, 468 U.S. 288.
139. See id.
140. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
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manner restriction, public discourse will still be distorted as individuals
will be afraid to express their beliefs, and the availability of knowledge
will be lessened for audiences.
B. Stifling an Individual’s Self-Realization
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61 stifles individuals’ selfrealization by preventing them from expressing their true beliefs. In this
instance, an individual who is passionate about protecting the natural
environment and their community is unable to express those beliefs in a
meaningful way, due to the fear of punishment under the statute or the
limitations on specific forms of conduct. Thus, an individual’s ownership
of his or her life is reduced, devaluing the individual’s beliefs due to the
inability to express them.141
C. Offending Democracy
Democracy is offended by enacting regulations that silence opposition
as the power to shape society is taken out of the hands of the government’s
constituents.142 By suppressing the speech of those opposing pipeline
construction within the state, the government restricts the ability of
citizens to articulate their desires, inherently excluding them from the
political process of making changes within their community and
perpetuating their plight. By attempting to suppress opposition to the
construction of additional pipelines, the government also lowers the
possibility of compromise, which carries the risk of a more radical or
violent method of expression in the future.143 Instead, allowing the
protestors to express their beliefs and attempt to persuade others will make
protestors more inclined to feel like a future governmental decision is a
legitimate one.144
For example, imagine an elementary school class burdened with the
task of deciding whether to have recess indoors or outdoors. If the teacher
allows some students to share their viewpoint expressing why they would
rather have recess outside, unpersuaded students who wish to stay inside
141. Emerson, supra note 55, at 879 (“For expression is an integral part of the
development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self.”).
142. See FARBER, supra note 55, at 7.
143. Emerson, supra note 55, at 883.
144. Emerson, supra note 55, at 885 (“The principle of political legitimization
. . . asserts that persons who have had full freedom to state their position and
persuade others to adopt it will, when the decision goes against them, be more
ready to accept the common judgement.”).
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will likely complain that the result is unfair when the majority votes in
favor of going out. Alternatively, if students on both sides are allowed to
express their preference in an attempt to persuade their classmates before
voting on the result, even the students who prefer to stay inside, though
likely disappointed, will be more inclined to feel as though this was a
legitimate result. This hypothetical illustrates how the suppression of
certain viewpoints fundamentally detracts from a democratic government.
VI. SOLUTION
In order for lower courts to reach a more policy-aligned approach
regarding the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court should
refine its approach to the content distinction by focusing on governmental
motive through the speaker-based and audience-based effects a regulation
has. The facial determination step articulated in Reed145 should give rise
to a rebuttable presumption in favor of its determination. Finding that a
regulation is facially content-neutral would give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that it is content-neutral. A law whose language contains no
reference to specific speech would be considered content-neutral, but
challengers of the regulation should be allowed to set forth evidence to
overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence
standard.146 If this presumption is successfully rebutted, the law should
then be considered content-based and subject to strict scrutiny.
It is well established that there is a category of laws that are facially
content-neutral yet subject to strict scrutiny, but a content-neutral
designation will likely be deadly to constitutional claims among the lower
courts due to the confusion that arises in attempting to ascertain legislative
intent.147 As the Court stated in United States v. O’Brien, “[i]nquiries into
congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter.”148 In O’Brien,
the Court looked to statements made by individual legislators throughout
the regulation’s decision-making process in order to determine legislative
intent but acknowledged that “[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
145. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015).
146. “Preponderance of the evidence is one type of evidentiary standard used
in a burden of proof analysis. Under the preponderance standard, the burden of
proof is met when the party with the burden convinces the fact finder that there is
a greater than 50% chance that the claim is true.” Preponderance of the Evidence,
LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preponder
ance_of_the_evidence [https://perma.cc/XA69-A5E7] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020).
147. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
148. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
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enact it.”149 In the present instance, even assuming that a senator had an
improper motive for sponsoring House Bill 727,150 other members of the
legislature may have had a purpose behind enacting changes to the statute
that is justified without reference to suppressing the expressive conduct of
protestors. If a bill is proposed by a senator with discriminatory intent, but
the rest of the majority who vote in its favor do so in pursuit of a purported
content-neutral interest, should this regulation then be subject to strict
scrutiny?
A more plausible solution is to assume the collective legislative intent
based upon the effects of a regulation. Consider a hypothetical school in
which the student government decides to purchase doormats for the
school’s entrance. Student A proposes this idea, stating that the increased
aesthetic value to the school will be more inviting to potential students,
providing an eventual financial benefit to the school. Student A’s true
motivation, however, is that A owns a doormat business, and using school
funds to buy doormats would result in a profit to A. Student B speaks in
favor of implementing doormats, stating that it may prevent slip-and-fall
incidents, as the mats will help reduce wet footprints around the school. A
handful of other students vote upon the proposition in the affirmative, but
they do not state their reasons.
Now imagine that the proposal passes and these effects are observed
over the following year: (1) the amount of slip-and-fall incidents in the
school is reduced; (2) the school purchased the mats from student A’s
business, resulting in a financial benefit to A; and (3) the school’s
incoming class has fewer students than prior classes. If personal financial
gain is an impermissible motive pursuant to school policy, was the
implementation of mats appropriate here? Looking to the statements made
by individual students, there seems to be no impermissible motive;
however, looking to the effects of the regulation, it seems as though A
violated the school’s policy by making a proposal for his personal financial
benefit.
The above hypothetical illustrates how, even when applying Reed’s
two-step analysis, a law that suppresses certain expressive conduct on the
basis of viewpoint in violation of public policy may still stand due to the
limited ability to discern collective intent from the rationales claimed by a
small number of legislators. In the doormat example, an effects-based
approach to determine legislative intent would unearth the impermissible
motive, allowing a reviewing body to weigh the impermissible interest of
personal financial gain with the permissible interest of preventing slip149. Id. at 384.
150. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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and-falls. Similarly, it would allow the speech suppressing effect of a
statute to be weighed against the benefits that the statute brings about.
Legislative intent is more accurately measured by assuming that
legislators collectively intended the effects of their regulation in order to
adequately discern whether a regulation is justified without reference to
the content of regulated speech and whether it is “narrowly tailored” to
serve a significant government interest.151
In regards to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:61, if the court
hearing the Spoon and Hat complaints accepts the purported governmental
intent or looks to comments from individual legislators, it would be
inappropriate to apply strict scrutiny under Reed. The regulation will likely
be upheld due to the statutory language, which purports to permit peaceful
protest.152 Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that any individual legislator
will state an intent to suppress opposition by silencing protestors. Yet, as
implemented, the statute has the impermissible effect of distorting
discourse by punishing a certain viewpoint.
Instead, determining the legislative intent through the effects of the
statute would allow the court, under Reed, to apply strict scrutiny because
the regulation’s effects would reveal an improper governmental motive,
despite the statute being facially content-neutral.153 Of course, this does
not mean that no proper governmental purpose exists, but rather allows the
reviewing court to weigh legislative intent in a more policy-aligned way.
Another benefit of this approach is that the legislature will likely be more
conscientious about passing regulations with speech suppressing effects,
resulting in a more careful tailoring of laws to meet the legislature’s goal.
One may argue that taking this approach will result in applying morerelaxed scrutiny to content-based laws which do not have an observable,
substantial skewing effect on public discourse. Those laws, however,
would not progress beyond the first step of Reed, because if they are
facially content-based, strict scrutiny will be applied.154 One may also
argue that content-neutral laws that further a substantial government
interest, but incidentally have the effect of weighing more heavily on one
viewpoint, would be subject to strict scrutiny even if the individual
legislators had no intention of discriminating against certain viewpoints.
151. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
152. Hat Complaint, supra note 9; Spoon Complaint, supra note 9.
153. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
154. See id. at 165 (“A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict
scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral
justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated
speech.”).
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While this is a natural consequence of this approach, it is the consequence
anticipated by policy. An individual’s access to truth and self-realization
should not be diminished because of a failure to consider the effects of a
regulation, or a dishonest stated intent for enacting a regulation.
CONCLUSION
Due to the values underlying the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the modifications to Louisiana Revised Statutes section
14:61 should be overturned. Despite being content-neutral on its face,
section 14:61 should be subject to strict scrutiny due to improper
legislative motive. Though some regulations of conduct are permissible, it
is impermissible for the legislature to suppress the expressive conduct of
those opposing the Bayou Bridge pipeline construction, as this suppression
results in a governmental distortion of public debate and offends the
democratic system. While there is a possibility that the statute may still be
upheld under strict scrutiny, provided that it is the least speech-restrictive
means of achieving a compelling state interest, Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 14:61 should not survive this challenge, because its vagueness and
standardless administrative discretion results in the suppression of lawful
speech, unrelated to the expressive conduct of demonstrators.
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